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Abstract—In this paper we propose SETS, a protocol with
main aim to provide secure and private communication during
emergency situations. SETS achieves security of the exchanged
information, attack resilience and user’s privacy. In addition,
SETS can be easily adapted for mobile devices, since field
experimental results show the effectiveness of the protocol on
actual smart-phone platforms.
Index Terms—Security; Privacy; Trust; Emergency Handling;
Crisis Management;
I. INTRODUCTION
In practice, in emergency situations such as earthquakes,
wildfires and floods, all privacy and security concerns fade
into the background. There are many emergency situations,
however, where these aspects are necessary. For example, the
medical history of patients should be available in comprehen-
sible format exclusively to medical first responders in order to
preserve the privacy of the patients.
The use of the Internet and specifically the use of Ad Hoc
Networks can be an indispensable tool for crisis management
and emergency response teams. Furthermore, there is a lack
of research regarding the security and privacy of the data sent
between first responders and the command post. The fact that
sensitive information is made available without adequate pro-
tection from malicious users can be potentially very damaging.
For the purpose of establishing a secure and trusted commu-
nication protocol, this paper focuses on three aspects. Firstly,
the confidentiality of the exchanged information. Secondly, the
resilience of the system to malicious attacks and thirdly, on
the privacy of the users.
For the first aspect, we propose a protocol that can be used
for authenticating the user who sends a request while at the
same time keeping message contents secret to everybody but
the receiver. Authentication is needed in order to prevent fake
requests from unauthorized users. This way we can ensure
that the resources of a team will only be spent on legitimate
requests - key to effective treatment of emergency situations
and crisis management.
For the second aspect, we analyze our protocol against
a multitude of attacks that is important in designing new
protocols regarding emergency handling.
Regarding the third aspect, each user that informs an au-
thority about an emergency, needs to send data that contain
sensitive information, such as the location and the time of
the event. Thus, any authority that receives these data will
have access to this specific information. For this reason, we
manage to protect the privacy of the sender of a message by
not revealing her real identity.
Furthermore, the analysis is backed by extensive experimen-
tal results demonstrating the protocol’s validity and efficiency.
In Section II, we review schemes that provide secure com-
munication in emergency situations. In Section III, we present
the problem statement and we define the basic terms used
throughout the paper. In Section IV, we present SETS, while
in Section V we provide a security discussion. In Section VI,
we present experimental evidence that shows the effectiveness
of our protocol and Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Although there are many emergency handling protocols, few
of them deal with the problem of securing the communica-
tion between users. Furthermore, there is a stark absence of
schemes that provide (partial) privacy in such environments.
T. Levin et al. in [1] proposed a system for secure dis-
tribution and control of sensitive information during crisis.
Authors, suggested two significant enhancements to emer-
gency information management: transient-memory encryption
for secure data storage and new hardware instructions to
support distributed emergency state management. Even though
the proposed protocol is considered as secure, it has a great
disadvantage, it is not easily applicable since, the existence of
a specific device called E-device is mandatory.
In [2] F. Dozer et al. focus on vehicle-to-infrastructure
communication for active safety, particularly between vehicles
and traffic lights. Their protocol assumes that emergency
vehicles send control messages to the traffic lights to actively
influence their current state. To reduce the number of vehicles
potentially hindering a free way for the emergency vehicle,
this communication allows each intersection to optimize the
traffic flow. Consequently, emergency vehicles can reach their
destination quicker and safer. Furthermore, they argue that
most of the services offered by road side units require a secure
authentication mechanism in order to trust the information and
prevent unauthorized use. This authentication process does not
reveal the identity of the vehicles involved.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT & DEFINITIONS
In an emergency handling situation, we distinguish three
different roles, each of which is instrumental in the smooth
and efficient intervention and termination of a situation.
Definition 1. An authority1 (ai) is an organization that
coordinates emergency response in a given context, such
as the Department of Homeland Security, non-governmental
organization, or a selected enterprise department. The set of
authorities is denoted as A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}.
Definition 2. First responders (FR) are members of an
agency/organization and asked to provide their services at a
scene of a disaster with main goal the successful resolution
of a situation. The set of first responders for the authority ai
is denoted as FRi = {rai1 , rai2 , . . . , raim}.
Definition 3. Third Party (TP ) is one or more data providers
that supply emergency information. Emergency information
is information designated to be available to emergency au-
thorities and first responders, which they may not have been
vetted or cleared to see. The set of third parties is denoted as
TP = {p1, p2, . . . , pl}.
Definition 4. A certification authority (CA) is an organization
that is responsible for issuing a credential to a new user pt.
Apart from that, CA validates to an authority ai if pt is
legitimate or not.
In this work we are concerned with the following problem:
Problem Statement: An authority ai ∈ A, receives a request
from a third party pt. First, ai has to check that pt is valid.
In order to do so, ai asks from pt to prove that she is indeed
legitimate. If the validation fails, ai does not proceed with the
request and thus she manages to protect her resources from
unauthorized users/fake requests. After the successful valida-
tion, pt needs to send back to ai the emergency information
in a secure way and then ai will forward the request to the
appropriate FR’s2. The problem is to create a protocol that
will guarantee the following: i)The identity of pt will not be
revealed to anyone, ii)Authority ai will not be deceived by
malicious users who sends fake requests and iii)Emergency
information that pt will send to ai will be protected from
unauthorized users and only ai will be in position to disclose
the information to the appropriate first responders.
Anonymous credentials systems, as described in [3], are
widely used and allows users to prove certain statements about
themselves by making use of certain attributes. This allows
them to inquire valuable services, while at the same time
hiding the user’s identity.
For the following sections, we assume that we are working
in a group Gq of prime order q, such that computing discrete
logarithms in Gq is infeasible. In addition to that, each
authority (ai, i ∈ [1, n]) has generated a public/private key
pair (kai/Kai ). The private key is kept secret, while the public
key is shared with the rest of the participants.
1An authority is also known as Emergency Operation Center (EOC).
2The problem of finding which element(s) of FRi are the most appropriate
for handling a specific event is beyond the scope of this paper.
Based on [4] we give some basic definitions regarding nyms
generation, issuing and validation of credentials.
Definition 5 (Pseudonym Generation). Nym generation (NG)
is a secure interactive procedure between a user pt and an
authority ai. The private input of pt and ai is Kpt and Kai
respectively, while their common input is kai . The execution
of NG has three outputs. First, a nym (N(pt,ai)) which is the
pseudonym of pt with ai and is common for both parties, a
private output Npts,ai for pt and a private output N
ai
s,pt for ai.
Informally, in a protocol for signing a value α, there are
two parties. A user who queries for a signature and a signer
with a pair of public/private keys.
Definition 6 (Signatures). Lets suppose that pt queries a
signature from ai. The signature scheme Sign(kai ,Kai ,m)
is the procedure that on input of a key pair kai/Kai and a
message m, outputs a signature s ∈ σkai (m). Additionally,
V erify(kai ,m, s) is the verification algorithm.
The common input to such a protocol is a commitment C
which is a basic component of many cryptographic protocols.
The main idea behind commitment schemes is that one party
pt commits a value β to another party ai in such a way that
ai has no idea what β is. Then, pt can reveal β and ai can
verify that this is indeed the value to which ai committed [5].
Definition 7 (Commitment Scheme). Suppose we are given a
commitment scheme (Commit, Check) where Commit(β, r)
is the commitment algorithm that produces a commitment to β
with randomness r. If c = Commit(β, r) then Check(c, β, r)
is the verification algorithm for the commitment to β.
IV. SETS PROTOCOL
In this section we present our main protocol (SETS) which
is based on [4]. In our model each user pt must first register
with the CA by revealing her true identity (public key kpt ),
as well as demonstrating the possession of a valid private key
(Kpt ). Then, CA issues a credential to pt which can be used
for further communication with an authority ai ∈ A. Upon
a request, ai checks the validity of pt by communicating
with CA. If pt is successfully authenticated, she sends the
emergency information in an encrypted form in order to protect
it from unauthorized access. Upon reception, ai is responsible
for forwarding the request to the appropriate FR’s.
The rest of the section is divided into the following parts: i)
Registration - Issue of a credential for a new user, ii) Validation
of the user who sends a request to an authority and iii)
Securing the messages that contains emergency information.
A. Registration (Fig. 1)
A user pt will have to first install the application on her
mobile device. During installation, pt communicates with the
CA where she is prompted to enter a username and a password
(passpt ). Then, automatically and on behalf of pt, a pub-
lic/private key pair (kpt = g
x/Kpt = x) is generated and saved
on the mobile device of pt. In order to protect this information,
the private key is encrypted with passpt . So, instead of keeping
kpt/Kpt on client’s device, kpt/ {Kpt}passpt is calculated and
saved for later use. For the registration, pt reveals kpt to CA
which uses KCA to sign kpt and outputs spt,CA ∈ σCA(kpt).
At this point, pt needs to establish a nym with CA,
so she generates a random string r that corresponds to
her private output Npts,CA, and computes N(pt,CA) =
Commit((kpt ,Kpt), r). A user’s nym is formed by taking
a random base a, such that the user does not know logga and
raising it to the power of x. This means that nyms are tied to
Kpt and thus we can verify that when a credential is issued it
will not be valid for any other secret than x. More precisely,
the following steps are taking place:
1) pt
(g,gx)−→ CA
2) CA a−→ pt: CA picks r˜ ∈R Z∗q , sets a = gr˜ and send
it to pt.
3) pt compute b = ax = gr˜
x
= gr˜x.
4) pt
(A,B)−→ CA: pt choose r ∈R Z∗q , and sets A = gr, B =
g˜r3.
5) CA c−→ pt: CA picks c ∈R Z∗q and sends it to pt.
6) pt
y=r+cx mod q−→ CA
7) CA checks that gy = g(r+cx) = grgcx = Agx
c
= Ahc
and g˜y = Bh˜c.
At the end of step 7, pt has established a nym N(pt,CA)
with CA.
Fig. 1. Generation of public/private keys and Acquisition of a Credential
The final step of the registration procedure is the generation
and issuing of a credential from CA to pt. For this purpose,
we will use the protocol Γ for producing a blind transcript and
the protocol for issuing a credential that is described in [4].
Protocol Γ:
1) pt
(A,B)−→ CA: pt picks r˜ ∈R Z∗q , sets A = gr, B = g˜r
and send it to CA.
2) CA c−→ pt: CA picks α, β ∈R Z∗q , sets A′ =
Agαhβ , B′ = (Bg˜αh˜β)γ , calculates c = H(A′ +B′) +
β mod q and send it to pt.
3) pt
y=r+cx mod q−→ CA
4) CA checks that gy = Ahc and g˜y = Bh˜c.
g(y+α) = grgcxga
⇔ g(y+α) = AgcxA′A−1h−β
⇔ g(y+α) = A′hch−β
⇔ g(y+α) = A′hc−β (1)
3pt knows x ∈ Z∗q : h = gx and h˜ = g˜x
We know that:
gy = gygαg−α
(1)⇔ gy = A′hc−βg−α
⇔ gy = A′hch−βA′−1Ahβ
⇔ gy = Ahc (2)
5) CA T−→ pt: T = ((A′, B′), H(A′, B′), y + α).
CA generates a private credential key (s1, s2) : s1, s2 ∈ Z∗q
and publishes the public credential key (g, h1, h2) : h1 =
gs1 mod p and h2 = gs2 mod p. The steps for issuing a
credential are described below:
1) CA
(A,B)−→ pt: CA calculates A = bs2 and B = (abs2)s1 .4
2) pt picks γ ∈ Z∗q .
3) Obtain transcript T1 by running Γ.
4) Obtain transcript T2 by running Γ.
5) Credential Cred(pt,CA) = (a
γ , bγ , Aγ , Bγ , T1, T2) is
issued.
B. Contacting an Authority
After pt has established a credential with CA, she can
contact any authority ai ∈ A in order to make a request.
As a first step, pt will have to prove to ai that she is a
legitimate user. To do so, she picks a random number rai
calculates frai (Cred(pt,CA)) = (a
rai , brai , Arai , Brai ) and
generates a session public/private key pair k′pt/K
′
pt . Then cal-
culates
〈{{
frai (Cred(pt,CA)), timestamp
}
kCA
, k′pt
}
kai
〉
and sends it to ai . Upon reception, ai decrypts
the received message with Kai , keeps k
′
pt and sends〈{
frai (Cred(pt,CA), timestamp)
〉
kCA
to CA. CA now de-
crypts the received message with KCA and checks whether
frai (Cred(pt,CA)) corresponds to a legitimate user or not.
C. Protecting Emergency Information
If CA validates that pt is a legitimate user, it sends to ai
a confirmation message along with the received time stamp
increased by one and encrypted with kai . Upon reception,
ai decrypts the message with Kai , finds the time stamp,
generates a one time public/private key pair (k′ai/K
′
ai ) and
sends to pt the following
〈{
k′ai , timestamp+ 1
}
k′pt
〉
. Upon
reception, pt finds k′ai by decrypting with K
′
pt and checks
the value of the time stamp. If the time stamp is correct,
she encrypts the emergency information with k′ai and sends
back to ai
〈
{EmergencyInfo, timestamp+ 2}k′ai
〉
. Now,
ai decrypts the received message with K ′ai and sends the
emergency information to the appropriate FRi’s encrypted
with her public key ({EmergencyInfo}kairt ). FRi’s decrypt
the received message and finds the specific information about
the event. At this point, FRi’s is in position to find the best
possible way to effectively handle the situation.
Furthermore, FRi’s sends back to ai a message
〈
{m}kai
〉
confirming that they indeed received the emergency informa-
tion correctly. Upon reception, ai decrypts
〈
{m}kai
〉
with
4a, b are known since CA and pt have already established N(pt,CA).
Fig. 2. User Authentication with an Authority & Sharing Emergency Information
Kai and sends back to pt an acknowledgment message m
′
encrypted with kpt . By doing so, we protect users from
situations where either a CA, ai or FRi’s are not available.
V. SECURITY DISCUSSION
In this section we analyze the behavior of SETS regarding
different kinds of attacks.
Theorem 1 (Man-in-the-Middle). Assume an adversary ADV
who intrudes into an existing connection (either between pt
and ai or between ai and CA) with main aim to intercept
the exchange of data and inject false information into it.
Then, ADV will not gain any useful information from the
interception.
Proof. Since all the communication between the participants is
encrypted and ADV does not know the corresponding private
keys he cannot decrypt the messages. Lets assume that ADV
is intercepting the transmitted messages in order to make an
offline attack. In this case, ADV can theoretically compromise
the keys. Even if ADV manage to retrieve the keys of all the
participants (pt, CA and ai) he will not be in a position of
retrieving crucial information from the data exchange. This is
achieved by the use of session keys that pt and ai generate
for their communication. Apart from that, since ADV will
be in position to successfully decrypt the messages that are
encrypted with the public keys of the participants (and thus
partially breaking the security of SETS), we propose that at
least CA and ai should change their keys frequently. By
doing this, ADV cannot glean any useful information from
the communication since all the messages between a registered
user pt, CA and ai will be encrypted either with the fresh keys
of CA or ai, or with the session keys k′pt or k
′
ai . 
Theorem 2 (Retransmission of Messages). Assume an adver-
sary ADV who eavesdrops on the communication between pt
and ai and retransmits a message that pt sent to ai. Then,
ADV cannot be validated as a legitimate user from CA.
Proof. Lets assume that an adversary ADV eavesdrops on
the first message m that pt sends to ai. Thus, ADV
knows
〈{{
frai (Cred(pt,CA)), timestamp
}
kCA
, k′pt
}
kai
〉
.
Then, since ADV is not aware of Kai sends m to ai, as
it is. Upon reception, ai cannot realize that this is a replay
message so, she decrypts m in order to find k′pt and forwards
the rest of the message to CA. At this point, CA checks the
time stamp that is embedded in m, finds that it is not a fresh
one and sends a message to ai to drop the connection. 
From Theorems (1) and (2) we conclude that SETS provides
robustness also to an Interleaving Attack where a selective
combination of information from one or more previous proto-
col executions is made by an adversary ADV .
Theorem 3 (Compromised CA and ai). Assume that CA
colludes with ai in order to break the privacy of pt. Then,
no information can be inferred about the identity of pt.
Proof. Let CA and ai act as adversaries in the sense that
they collude to break the privacy of a legitimate user pt. First,
pt sends
〈{{
frai (Cred(pt,CA)), timestamp
}
kCA
, k′pt
}
kai
〉
to ai. From this message, ai can only find k′pt . So, after
decrypting, she sends to CA the first part of the message
which is encrypted with the public key of CA. Then, CA
can validate that pt is valid without knowing who exactly she
is. Additionally, if CA and ai collude to find the real identity
of pt they will fail. As we can see, pt does not send to ai
her real public key. Instead she generates and sends a session
key k′pt that will be used for further communication between
them. So, since none of them knows the public key of pt they
are unable to find her real identity. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To prove the effectiveness of SETS, we experiment on a
wi-fi network with mobile devices (PDAs). Our PDAs use
a 624MHz processor, 128MB RAM and operates running
Windows Mobile 6. The capabilities of the specific device
compared to conventional commercial Tablet PC’s and devices
is limited and thus the measurements we present in this section
will be more efficient in devices with better hardware.
Our experiments have aimed at analyzing two main perfor-
mance metrics; processing time and communication overhead.
Each of the experiments was run through 1000 iterations.
A. Processing Time
The first phase of our experiments involved measuring the
processing time of SETS. To this end, we measured the
completion time for the encryption decryption of different
kinds of messages. For the encryption and decryption we used
the RSA cryptosystem with keys of 256bits length.
As we described in Section IV a user pt will have to encrypt
on her mobile device the emergency information which apart
from the location of the event can also contain a media file.
Figure 3(a), illustrates the time in seconds that the PDA
needed in order to encrypt and decrypt the same image in
the following resolutions: i) 320X240 (32.3 kb), ii) 640X480
(73.5 kb), iii) 800X600 (100kb) and iv) 1024X768 (163kb).
(a) Time for Enrcyption/Decryption of Images
(b) Communication Delay
Fig. 3. Image Encryption/Decryption & Communiction Delay
As we can see from the graph, for an image of 320X240
resolution the encryption time is 0.13sec while for the case of
a more detailed image (1024X768) the time still remains less
than one second (0.56sec). Moreover, since an FR will receive
from ai the emergency information in a encrypted form, she
will have to decrypt it. So, we also measured the time that is
needed for the decryption of the above encrypted images by
the PDA. From figure 3(a) we obtain that the decryption of
an image (1024X768) needs 0.62sec.
Furthermore, we implemented the same process for video
files with different resolutions and durations. Figure 4(a)
illustrates the time needed for the encryption of a video while
figure 4(b) illustrates the times for the decryption process. As
we can see, the average time for a 10sec video of 320X240
resolution is 3.64sec while for the decryption of the same
video 3.68sec needed. Additionally, for the encryption of a
30sec video of 1024X768 resolution the average time was
15.84sec while for the decryption 17.30sec.
From the above results we can observe that the encryp-
tion/decryption process, even for video files with a satisfactory
resolution that could point out the details of an event, is
efficient even for mobile devices with limited resources.
B. Communication Dealy
In the second phase of our experiments, we measured the
communication delay of encrypted packets over the network.
For that purpose, we established a network between a laptop
computer and two PDAs that were exchanging packets of
(a) Video Encryption
(b) Video Decryption
Fig. 4. Video Encryption/Decryption on a PDA
different sizes through wireless communication. Figure 3(b)
illustrates the time that needed for messages from 1.03MB to
4.92MB to transmitted from the PDA to the laptop and vice
versa. For a message with size between 1MB and 3MB the
time is less than 6sec while for a file with a size near to 5MB
the average time is slightly more than 10sec.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented SETS, a protocol with main aim
to provide secure communication during emergency situations.
The effectiveness of our protocol is proved in our security
discussion where SETS’ appears to be resistant to Replay,
Forced Delay and Man-in-the-Middle attacks. SETS manages
to protect the user privacy through anonymity. Finally, we
proved that SETS can be easily adapted for mobile devices,
since field experimental results showed the effectiveness of the
protocol on actual smart-phone platforms.
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